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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CAROL HOFFMAN I

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Supreme Court No. 18184

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA I
Defendant and Respondent.:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

-STATEMENT OF 'THE NATURE OF 'THE :CASE
This is an action on a contract of insurance seeking payment
of certain benefits due as a result of the accidental death of ap-

pellant's spouse, Louis Hoffman.
DISPOSTTION OF 'THE :COURT BELIEF

Following a nonjury trial before the Honorable Dean E. Conder,
the court below entered judgment for defendant, no cause of action .
. RELTEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant respectfully requests that the judgment entered below be reversed and the matter remanded to the court below with instructions to enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $50,000.00
plus prejudgment interest from the date of April 9, 1979 to the date
of judgment.
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FACTS
The essential facts of this case are not disputed by the
parties.

The parties stipulated that Carol Hoffman had a policy of

accident insurance in force with the Life Insurance Company of North
America which provided for payment to her of $50, 000. 00 in the event
of the accidental death of her husband, Louis Hoffman, at the time
he was killed on February 5, 1979.

The sole question in this action

was whether the manner in which Mr. Hoffman died was an accident
within the meaning of the policy.

The parties stipulated that

Hoffman died as a direct result of being shot by Salt Lake City polic
officers Frank Hatton-Ward and Gilbert Salazar. (R. 112)
The events which led to Mr. Hoffman's fatal encounter with the
officers began on the eveni!lg of February 5, 1979, when Mrs. Hoffman
informed her husband that they needed to have a serious discussion
because she had consulted a lawyer regarding divorce.

Mr. Hoffman,

who had been having mental problems for which he was being treated
by Dr. Robert Mohr, became agitated at this point and went to the base
ment of the family house and obtained a pistol.

He went outside the

home, while Carol Hoffman was telephoning for police assistance, and
when asked by his daughter if the gun was loaded he fired the pistol
in the air.

He then got into the family vehicle, a jeep "Cherokee"

wagon, and drove off.
Salt Lake City police officer Lorraine Killpack responded to
Mrs. Hoffman's call, and after discussing the situation with the appellant and her daughter, Karee, began an attempt to locate Mr.
Hoffman, which included arranging for his descripti~n and that of the
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vehicle he was driving to be transmitted to other city officers.
Sometime thereafter, approximately an hour from the time of
Mrs. Hoffman's initial call, officer Killpack observed Mr. Hoffman
drive by his home at 426 Redondo Avenue, where she was parked and
waiting.

When he didn't stop, she began following him and requested

the assistance of other officers.
responded to this call.

Officers Salazar and Hatton-Ward

At approximately the intersection of 700

East and 2100 South all three officers were behind the Hoffman vehicle and an attempt was made to pull him over.

(R. 208-210)

Mr.

Hoffman didn't .respond to the officers' lights and sirens by pulling
over, but instead proceeded to drive onto the freeway, exit at State
Street, and then drive over· a circuitous route back to his home at
426 Redondo.

He wasn't speeding during the "chase" and the whole

journey only took about 5

minutes~

(R. 137, 138)

When Mr. Hoffman arrived at his house he pulled his car down
the driveway.

The officers all parked their vehicles near the street.

Officers Hatton-Ward and Salazar approached Mr. Hoffman's vehicle from
the northwest on foot, unitl both were positioned on the passenger's
side at the front door window, which was rolled down (R. 140-142, 160161).

Officer Killpack got out of her car and approached Mr. Hoffman's

vehicle, stopping on the driver's side at the rear (northeast) corner
of car.

(R. 210-211)

From this point there is a divergence in the testimony of the
officers concerning what 'transpired.

Officer Salazar testified that

from his position at the passenger's window he saw Mr. Hoffman seated
behind the wheel with a pistol in his right hand, positioned level
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with the steering wheel and pointed up in the air.

(R. 142)

He testi·

fied that Mr. Hoffman "pi voted" his shoulders both directions and thei;:
pointed the gun at Salazar and Hatton-Ward, whereupon Salazar shot
Hoffman.

(R. 143-144)

Hatton-Ward testified that when he arrived at the passenger's
window and saw Hoffman with the gun he began yelling at him to "drop
~·:

....

the gun. "

He testified, however, that Hoffman never pointed the gun

in his direction (or that of Salazar), but that Hoffman got out of thE
vehicle and turned in such a fashion that the pistol was pointing dom
the driveway where Hatton-Ward felt other officers would be located
(though he wasn_' t aware of anyone actually being there).

Because of

this assumed threat to others, Hatton-Ward shot Hoffman three or four
times.

Hatton-Ward testified he fired once before he heard Salazar's

shot, which was the first time he became aware of Salazar's presence.
(R. 165-169)

Hatton-Ward testified that he actually fired when he

couldn't see the pistol Hoffman was holding.
Q.

When Mr. Hoffman pivoted to get out of the

car, at some point you lost sight of the weapon that
he had in his hand, didn't you?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Passed between your line of vision and his

A.·

That's correct.

Q.

And it was at that point when you fired?

A.

That's correct.

body?

(R. 167)
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..

Officer Killpack, who was positioned at the rear of the vehicle
at a spot Hatton-Ward felt that the gun was in the process of being
pointed; testified she

was commanding Hoffman to get out of the car

(R. 211), and that when he did he had the gun pointed at the ground,
held in his right hand with his elbow up at shoulder level.
his position when shot.
of four feet.

This was

She made these observations from a distance

(R. 214)

At the time of trial, Dr. Robert Mohr, a psychiatrist, testified
that he had recently been treating Mr. Hoffman for serious mental illness, which he diagnosed as high paranoia.
as

extrem~ly

·Q.

He described Mr. Hoffman

agitated and psychotic.
Let me interrupt you.

When you say psycho-

tic, define what you mean by that term for the Court.
A.

A psychotic individual, is an individual who

is reality testing.
areas.

He is de.fective in one or more

These areas of lack of reality testing can

overlap or they can be fairly circumscribed in a
grossly psychotic individual.

Now, the high paranoid

usually has a specific delusional system, which Mr.
Hoffman did.

And it extended into a number of dif£er-

ent areas, but at the time that I saw him it was
really all inclusive.

I think all of the areas of

his thinking were really pretty mixed.

q.

You indicate that there are certain charac-

teristics of a person who is grossly psychotic.

Did

you make that diagnosis about Mr. Hoffman?
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A.

Yes.

I did.

Q.

Did you ever draw any conclusion as to the

necessity of a more aggressive treatment for Mr.
Hoffman?
A.

Well, from the first time that I saw him,

I suggested that he let me treat him at the hospital.
And he refused that immediately.

And of course as

you would note from the dates of treatment, I saw him
every day or when he would permit.

Q.

What were the c-ircurnstances of that inter-

view, Doctor?
A.

Well, the intensity and severeness of the

illness, and my attempt to_ gain his conf.idence and
get him into a hospital where he wouldn't be a danger to himself or to others.

Q.

In this period of time when you were seeing

Mr. Hoffman, did you draw any conclusions about whether
or not he was delusional during that period?

A.

I did.

Q.

And what was your conclusion?

A.

He was profoundly delusional.

Q.

Doctor, assuming that the last day you in-

dicated that you saw Mr. Hoffman, which was February
5, 1979, was the day of his death,

[do] you have an

opinion as to whether or not Mr. Hoffman on that date
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was suffering from a mental impairment 'which
would inhibit his ability to make rational decisions about the consequences of his conduct?
A.

I do.

Q.

And what is that opinion?

A.

That he was psychotic and at that time not

able to make sound, rational judgments.

Q.

For the purpose of my next question I'll ask

you to assume several facts, Doctor, which would be
subsequent to your interview with Mr. Hoffman on
February 5th, that he returned home, that while at
home, he had a discussion with Carol Hoffman his wife
wherein she indicated to him that she had .seen an attorney with regard to possibly seeking a divorce from
Mr. Hoffman.

That at that time he became upset, went

downstairs and obtained a firearm.

Returned upstairs,

left the house, and subsequently encountered three
police officers in police vehicles who attempted to
pull him over.

Turned on their sirens, followed him

for some period of time, approximately five to ten
minutes on the highway; whereupon Mr. Hoffman returned
to his house.

That subsequent to that, the officers

confronted him at this vehicle, made a request for
him to take certain actions which would include dropping the firearm that he had, and exiting his vehicle.
My question would be, assuming those facts, do you
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have an opinion as to whether or not Mr. Hoffman's
mental illness that you've described would have produced or controlled his responses to those stimuli
that I have described to you.
A.

Oh, I think because of the highly unstable

nature of his whole emotional state at that time,
any unexpected, intense or threatening incident would
have caused a reaction of unreasonable magnitude, and
unpredictable reaction.
Q.

Would that reaction be a product of his mental

illness?
A.

In my opinion it would.

(R. 115-117)

This testimony regarding Mr. Hoffman's mental illness was not
disputed.
. ARGUMENT ANn AUTHORITY
POINT 1: THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE INSURED'S DEATH DID NOT OCCUR BY
ACCIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INSURANCE
POLICY IN QUESTION.
The sole issue presented by this action is whether Louis
Hoffman's death as a result of being shot by Salt Lake City police
officers was caused Y,y "accident" within the meaning of the insurance
policy in question.

While this Court has not been called upon pre-

viously to decide whether injuries or death produced by the intentiona
conduct of those other than the insured can be said to be the product
of an accident, every jurisdiction which has considered the question
has answered' in the affirmative.

See the cases collected in· Annot.'
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49 A.L.R.3d 67 (1973) •

Many of the early decisions concerning the

accidental nature of injuries received as the result of intentional
acts of others involved cases wherein the insured was injured by law
enforcement officers.

While some early decisions concluded that pro-

viding coverage for injuries received in confrontations with legal
authorities would be contrary to public policy, this logic has now
been universally repudiated and, in the absence of a policy exclusion
for injuries incurred as a direct result of violation of the law, the
fact that a confrontation with police officers gives rise to the injuries for which benefits are sought is not viewed as a bar to recovery.

See Anno·t., 43 A.L.R.3d 1120 (1973)

~

Indeed, in an analo-

gous case, this Court rejected the so called public policy argument
more than 3 5 years ago in- Sanders· v. Metropolitan Life Tns .- Co. ,
104 Utah 75, 13B P.2d 239

(194~).

In Sanders, ·su'p·ra, the Court was presented with a case wherein
accidental death benefits were claimed as the restilt of the death of
a boy who died from injuries received when the vehicle in which he was
riding overturned while he and his companion were in the process of
attempting to elude police officers.

This Court held that there was

nothing about such conduct on the part of. the insured which precluded
recovery.

The Court specifically rejected both the contention that

benefits should be denied for violation of public policy and the
argument that the insured's conduct in participating in a high speed
chase while attempting to evade officers was of such a nature as to
make his injury and death a natural and probable consequence of his
actions.
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It was on the basis of a similar argument by the defendant in
this case that the Court below denied recovery to the plaintiff
Carol Hoffman.

The defendant argued, and while memorandum decision,

findings of facts and conclusions of law don't speak to the question,
the court apparently agreed that Mr. Hoffman's actions were of such
a nature as to make his death at the hands of the officers a natural
and forseeable result of his conduct.
While the appellant would assert that such a factual finding
would be wholly inconsistent with the evidence offered at trial showing that Mr. Hoffman was not engaged in any aggressive or treatening
conduct when shot, but rather was complying with officer Killpack's
stated requests, appellant bel.ieves that the resolution_ of such a
factual dispute is totally immaterial to the result of the action wher
the proper principles of contract law are applied to this action.
Expanding upon the logic of this Court's decision in: -Sande-rs,
supra, many courts have now completely rejected the requirement that
an injury, to be covered under the terms of an accident policy, must
not have been a fores.eeable result of the decea:sed' s own conduct.
These courts have held that such a restriction on coverage raises
issues which are tantamount to contributory negl;Lgence and have no
place in a contract action.
In Mohn v.· American Casualty Co., 458 Pa. 576, 326 A.2d 346
( 197 4) , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a case' wherein the
plaintiff was seeking recovery under accident policies for fatal injuries suffered by his son, who was shot by a police officer while
fleeing from the scene of a bu!glary he was in the pro.cess of commit-
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The Court began by noti~g that in

ting.

accident policies the law is now reasonably
'?l:ar that the fact that events causing the
in]ury may be traceable to an intentional
act of a third party does not preclude the
occurrence from being an 'accident.' Thus,
the test of whether injury is a result of an
accident is to· be determined from the viewpoint ·of the· ·insured and not from the viewpoint of the one that committed the act
causing the injury.
326 A.2d at 348 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
The Court went on to note that "the modern legal trend is to
abandon the former 'reasonably foreseeable' rule and treat the occurranee as accidental even though it resulted from the insured's criminal conduct."

326 A.2d at 351.

This is pro.per, the Court reasoned,

because
(a) contract of insurance like any other
contract requires that the intention of the
parties be determined from the words of the
instrument. Furthermore, where the contract
is one of insurance any ambiguity in the language of the document is to be read in the
·light most strongly supporting the insured.
Under the language of the pol.icies presently
under consideration it ·is· cle·a·r· that no proVis·ion: was· made that condu·ct shou'ld be· exc1·uded 'from cove·rage bec·ause· it p·os·ed ·an· unr·eason·able r·i-sk ()f· ha·rm to the deceased. · ·To
acc·ept the narrow and~ r_e~:tric:=t7d mea'riing of
the term · acc.idental bodily in]ury" and to
deny r:ec·overy to thi·s benef icia·ry where the
langu·age of ·the polic~es __c_lear:ly do. not -~up
·port such a· construction would be violative
of the fun:aam·e·nta'l tenets of insurance law
and totally without Justi.fication ·in logic.
11

326 A.2d at 351-352 (emphasis added).
Other courts have also rejected the reasonably foreseeable rule
because, as was noted in Harvey v. St. ·Paul Western Ins. Co., 166 So.
2d 822 (Fla. App. 1964),
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such doctrine of foreseeability is a doctrine
totally unsuitable and unadoptable in construing accident policies. Moreover, the
rationale of these cases seems to be founded
not only in the doctrine of foreseeability
but intrinsically in negligence on the part
of the insured. Were we to make this principle a part of the law of this State, it
would not only do vi·olence to the reason for
buying accident insurance but if it did not
preclude recovery in a great majority 1 of
deaths arising from accidents, it would place
an almost insurmountable burden on the insured
to enforce liability.
116 So. 2d at 823..

See also,· Be·ckham

v. TraveTers Tris·. Co., 424 Pa.

107, 225 A. 2d 532 (1967) ;· Wetzel· V; we·stirighou·se Electric Corp.,

393 A.2d 470 (Pa. 197&).
By the same logic. employed by this Court in rejecting the notio:
in Sanders, supra, that driving at a high rate of speed to elude

~of..:.

ficers wasn't conduct which rendered injuries resulting from that con·
duct nonaccidental, this Court should now hold that in the absence of
a policy_ provision demanding a contrary result no degree of "comparative fault" on the part of the insured should render injuries receive(
by him as nonaccidental if those injuries are caused by the intentional conduct of others.

To hold otherwise in the instant case would be

to afford the defendant insurer an implied exclusion not specified by
the policy itself and one which has been specifically rejected by the
Courts of the stat.e where the company resides.

See Mohn v. American

Casualty Co., supra,· Beckham V. Tr·avelers Tns. co·., supra.
The appellant respectfully submits that in light of the evidence
presented in the court below it was error for the court to fail to
enter judgment for plaintiff.
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POINT II. AN INDIVIDUAL WHO, BY REASON OF
MENTAL IMPAIRMENT, CANNOT RATIONALLY EVALUATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS CONDUCT NOR
CONTROL HIS ACTIONS CANNOT BE DEEMED TO
HAVE INTENDED OR FORESEEN THE NATURAL OR
PROBABLE RESULTS OF HIS CONDUCT.
Even if this Court were to conclude that when viewed objectively
the decea.sed's conduct was such as to make his death a natural and
probable consequence of his action, and therefore not an unintended
or unanticipated result of such acts, and that therefore his death
would not normally be properly deemed an accident, Mr. Hoffman's mental disease ·at the time he engages.in such conduct deprived him of
the ability to make rational decisions about the consequences of his
actions or to control his behavior in light of probable consequences
of such conduct, which precludes application of the objective "reasonably foreseeable" test.
While the respondent has argued throughout these proceedings
that the definition of what constitutes an accident must be determined
by "objective" criteria, every court which has considered the question
has held that a mental impairment which deprives an individual of the
ability to rationally evaluate the consequences of his actions, or to
control his actions in light of their probable consequences, renders
injuries received through such conduct accidental.

This is true be-

cause one who is insane cannot be said to have "intended" the natural
results of his actions, nor to have forseen their probable consequences
becaµse his mental disease has deprived him of this ability.

~11

courts considering the question, therefore, have held that injuries resulting from conduct which when engaged in by a normal individual
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might be ·said to be merely the natural, probable and foreseeable
result of his acts, are accidentally incurred when suffered by one
not having the mental capacity to anticipate such results.

491 (N .J. 1.935), the Court held that an individual who was shot and

killed by a police officer while violently resisting arrest and
threatening the police with an axe died as a result of an accident
within the meaning of the insurance policy in question.

The Court

noted that it was not
questioned that the insured met his death
by external and·violent means. We have then
to consider the sole remaining contention of
the defendant that he did not meet his death
through accidental means~
Now an "accident," in this connection,
is usual·ly defined as an event that takes
place without one's foresight or expectation,
and that definition was given recognition in
Kennedy· v _. United State.sf. FideTitY, · ·etc.·,· Co. ,
113 N.J. Law, 431, 174·A. 531. Foresight or
expectation, of course, imply an ability to
think and reason. Cases to which we have been
referred are not precisely in point, but we
believe that the reasoning thereof discloses
that the pertinent rule l.s this: If the reasoning faculties of the insured were so far
impaired that he was not able to understand
the moral character and general nature and
consequences and effect· of his acts in so
resisting arrest, and was impelled thereto by
an insane impulse of a disordered mind which
he had not the power to resist, such death
was through external, violent, and accidental
means within the meaning of the policy.
180 A. at 492.

This same approach was employed by the Colorado Court of Appeals
in· Continental Casualty Company v. Maguire, 471 P.2d 636 (Colo. App.
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1970), even though ~olorado is a jurisdiction which, in the normal
case, retains the "reasonably foreseeable" definition of an accident.
However, faceq with a case wherein the plaintiff, who was suffering
from a mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenic reaction, paranoid
type, was blinded by fragments of an exploding tear gas cannister
fired by police -officers after plaintiff had wounded an officer in
a gun battle, the court rej.ec.ted the defendant insurer's contention
that
Maguire's injuries were not the result of an
accident, but were the natural, probable, and
foreseeable consequence of his intentional
acts in provoking the assault by the police
officers. However, the court found that Maguire,
at the time of his injuries, was not engaged
in any aggressive acts. Furthermore, no action
· -·b'f Ma·gu'iYe '·s· ·in' :cotinection ·with this inc·ident
was· vo·1untary o·r wrongful because· he· was insane
·at the· time .
471 P.2d at 628 (emphasis added).
See also, Williams v. Prudential Ins. Co., 271 I.11. App. 532
(1933); Tuttle v. "Iowa State Travel·ing Me.n's Ass'n, 104 N.W. 1131
(Iowa 1905) .
While the particular question herein presented has not been
widely litigated, in every reported decision where it has been raised
the court has held that injuries suffered by a mentally impaired insured as a result of an intentional act of another in response to
insured's own conduct are injuries caused by accident.

Appellant

would submit that this is an appropriate result in all such cases and
urge this Court to adopt the position shared by all other jurisdictions having considered the question.
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Such a holding would be entirely in accord with previous decisions of this Court which have recognized that determinations
about what does or does not fall within the meaning of the term accident must include the subjective facts about the insured which are
known by the Court.
The defendant urged upon the trial court the proposition that
the question of the foreseeability of the result of Mr. Hoffman's
actions must be judged by an objective standard and that if the result was foreseeable to a. reasonable person, then· the result was not
an accident because it was not "an unexpected or unanticipated occurrence."

Handley v. Mutual Li.f"e· Tns •· Co., 106 Utah 184, .14 7 P. 2d 319

(1944).

While there is no indication in the court's findings, con-

clusions ·or memorandum decision,·· apparently the trial court accepted
this objective test fn determining that Mr. Hoffman's shooting was
not unexpected or unforeseeable from his conduct.

However, Utah law

has never adopted an obj.ecti ve test for determining if a particular
result of an act constitutes an accident.

That_our.law has.always

regarded such a determination to be based on .the subjective circumstanc
attendant to the particular insured can be seen by comparison of two
cases with differing results involving what appear to be identical
circumstances when viewed "objectively," but which produce different
results because the actual test of whether or not a particular result
is an accident is subjective, based upon what is known about he insured when the acts occur.
In Handley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, the Court considered
a claim for accidental death benefits made by the widow of an insured
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who died as a resu_l t of complications following surgery.

After

acknowle~ging that an .accident, within the meaning of an insurance

policy, can be the product of actions do.ne intentionally if such acts
produce unexpected results, the Court held that the insured died as
a result of an accident because the medical complications which caused
his death were not expected, nor anticipated nor reasonably foreseeable as a result of his surgery..

See also, Whatcott v. Continental

Cas. Co . , 8 5 Utah 4 0 6 , 3 9 P • 2d 7 3 3 ( 1.9 3 5) •
An apparently -contrary ·result was reached in XeTlogg v. Cali'fornia Western· ·Life· Tn:s·; Co_., 201 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1949), wherein the
Court held that a widow was not

entitl~d

to accidental death benefits

when her husband died fr·om .post-operative shock caused by his surgery.
After acknowledging the holdings bf the previously decided cases finding coverage-under apparently similar facts, the Court noted that in
this case, because of the subjective facts :particular to the insured,
his death was a foreseeable result of the s·urgery because he had previously exhibited a susceptability to shock symptoms following sur. gery, his physical c.o.ndition for which surgery was necessary was such
that a prolonged operation and administration of a.nesthetic was re.:.
quired, thus increasing the normal risk of shock due to surgery, and
he was in such a genera_lly weakened condition prior to surgery that
the risk of his death from the conditions caused by the surgery was
highly foreseeable..

The Court reasoned that it was not appropriate

to view the cases as "objectively" the same.
Each individual may be considered the
average individual unless the facts disclose that in reality he is not; and when
the facts do so show, then the question
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of the accidental nature of the result
must be measured by this knowledge-.
201 P.2d at 952.
These decisions show that the subjective circumstances of the
insured must be considered in determining if a particular result has
occur.red by accident.

As previously not~d, it is ;Erom the viewpoint

of the insured that the unexpected or unanticipated nature of the
results must be examined, and due to his mental illness Louis Hoffman
was incapable of anticipating what a reasonable person might have
foreseen, or making any reasonable judgment about the possible or
probable consequences of his actions .
. CONCLUSION

In the present case, the policy of insurance contains no provisions excluding coverage for violation of law or for conduct creating an unreasonable risk of harm.

Under such circumstances the better

reasoned decisions conclude that proper application of contract principles requires a finding of coverage..

However, consideration of

that issue isn't.necessary because even those jurisdictions which
still adopt the reasonably foreseeable rule, and deny coverage for
injuries which are a natural incident of the insured's own conduct,
recognize an exception when the insured is mentally impaired, as the
evidence clearly shows Mr. Hoffman to have been.

Because he was men-

tally incapable of foreseeing the natural consequences of his action,
Mr. Hoffman's death was "accidental" within the universally accepted
meaning of that term, it having been established that he died by violent and external means while severely mentally impaired.

-18Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Based upon the foregoing authority, appellant respectfully requests that the judgment entered below be reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment for appellant, together with her costs
and prejudgment interest.
DATED this

- - -day

of March, 1982.

DAVID ECKERSLEY//
Attorney for Plain'.tiff

M.
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